Non-binding Coordination in Regulation by Aubin, David et al.
17Network Industries Quarterly | vol. 12 | no 2  | 2010 
A R T I C L E
CROSS-SECTORAL
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Non-binding coordination instruments are widespread in the regulation of network industries, and crucial to 
avoid the negative consequences of specialised regulatory arrangements.
In the post-liberalisation area, utility companies operate in a context of multilevel regulation, involving a wide set 
of authorities with general or sector-based competencies. 
At each level of authority, the competencies are divided 
between diff erent organisations (for example, ministries, 
regulatory agencies, and competition courts). Such a spe-
cialisation within the regulatory arrangement can poten-
tially generate overlaps and blind spots, as well as a lack of 
eff ectiveness. Th e aim of this article is to underline the role 
of non-binding coordination instruments in the potential 
prevention of the negative consequences of specialisation 
in the regulation of network industries. It shows what 
kinds of non-binding coordination instruments are used 
in multi-level, multi-players, and multi-tasks regulatory 
arrangements. Th e empirical analysis is based on a com-
parison of two utility sectors, energy and telecommunica-
tions, in Belgium.
Specialisation and Coordination in Regulatory 
Arrangements
Regulatory bodies are involved in several tasks: translation 
of general policies in more concrete rules (for example, 
standards of interconnection); application of rules in in-
dividual cases (for example, license for supply); and moni-
toring of compliance (for example, sanctioning). While 
regulatory functions have for a long time been carried out 
by central administrations, they are increasingly shared 
with, and delegated to, specialised agencies and other both 
supra- and sub-national authorities. Th e regulatory ar-
rangement encompasses all the organisations involved in 
these regulatory tasks.
Liberalisation broke up the multi-objective bureau-
cracies embodied in monolithic departments into small 
single-purpose organisations, with limited objectives and 
specifi c tasks, a process called specialisation. Specifi cally 
towards the regulation of utilities, four dimensions of 
specialisation can be identifi ed: fi rst, a vertical specialisa-
tion across governmental levels (for example, European, 
federal and regional); secondly, a horizontal specialisation 
within a sector, divided between several public sector or-
ganisations (for example, ministry and agencies); thirdly, 
specialisation between sector-specifi c regulators and gen-
eral competition authorities; and fourthly, specialisation 
between sectors.
Without suffi  cient coordination, a specialised regulato-
ry arrangement is at risk to progressively lose macro-con-
trol, if specialised organisations only manage the specifi c 
issue they have competence over, without taking into ac-
count multiple societal interests. Coordination is a process 
that aims at enhancing the voluntary and forced alignment 
of tasks and eff orts of organisations within the public sec-
tor (Verhoest and Bouckaert 2005). It may help to reduce 
administrative burdens, improve the enforcement of regu-
lation, and increase the regulators’ accountability.
Th e coordination instruments can be more or less in-
tegrative: Organisations may simply limit themselves to 
exchange information and adapt unilaterally, or they can 
reach mutual adjustments through extensive negotiation 
or coercion. Among these, some are non-binding. First, 
the non-binding advice or consultation involves a tier into 
the decision-making process of another regulatory body 
(for example, the main sector regulator drafts a minister’s 
decision or gives an advice about a case to the competition 
authority). Th is instrument is procedural, that is, specifi -
cally defi ned in legally set procedures. Second, structural 
interactions between regulators occur within advisory 
platforms, procedures for information exchange, or other 
coordinating functions or bodies. Th us, a series of non-
binding coordination instruments exist which may help 
to limit the negative eff ects of specialisation in regulatory 
arrangements.
Non-Binding Coordination in Belgian 
Telecommunications
In Belgium, the liberalisation of the sector is due to the 
European Union policy that has opened the market in 
1998. In order to tackle the persisting market dominance 
of some, the EU revised the legal framework in 2003 and 
pushed economic regulation very close to general competi-
tion law. Th e regulatory arrangement is centralised around 
the European Commission, while the sector-based regula-
tor—namely the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecom-
* The authors are political scientists at Université catholique de Louvain and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.Corresponding Author Email: <david.aubin@uclouvain.be>
A R T I C L E
18 Network Industries Quarterly | vol. 12 | no 2  | 2010 
A
R
TI
C
LE
munications (BIPT)—conducts the market analyses and 
imposes specifi c obligations to the dominant operators 
(for example, about transparency, network access or tar-
iff s).
Th e market analysis procedure refl ects quite well both 
the vertical and horizontal specialisation of telecoms regu-
lation, and the related procedural coordination. In this 
procedure, BIPT fi rst organises a public consultation, 
then sends its draft decision for a non-binding advice 
to the Competition Council, as well as the Regulators’ 
Conference (CRC), composed of the regional media regu-
lators, which can decide to handle the issue itself. In the 
second phase, the European Commission organises an 
informal pre-notifi cation meeting with BIPT, before the 
institute formally notifi es the expected measures. Th e ab-
sence of ‘serious doubts’ from the Commission about this 
notifi cation is interpreted as an agreement—if not, the 
regulator’s decision is frozen. Consider the following: A 
negotiation takes place with BIPT; the Commission ve-
toes the decision in case of failure, a situation seldom ob-
served. As of 2010, the new EU telecoms regulator, Berec, 
will issue non-binding recommendations about market 
analyses as well. Although vertical coordination is formally 
based on hierarchy, cooperation is strong with the national 
authorities.
 Coordination in the telecoms sector also happens 
between the Government and sector-based regulators at 
diff erent levels. At the European level, advisory platforms 
deliver non-binding advice about draft directives that are 
often respected (for example, the European Regulators 
Group). Inside the European Commission, a joint task 
force coordinates electronic communications issues with 
general competition. At the Belgian level, law-making is a 
competence of the Federal Government, but BIPT drafts 
legislation. Appeals against BIPT can be lodged at the 
Court of Appeal in Brussels. At the Regional level, the me-
dia regulators are only involved in broadcasting regulation.
Th e division of tasks between the competition authori-
ties and telecoms regulators is clear, and both organisa-
tions cooperate with each other. Th e Competition Council 
gives non-binding advises on the market analyses of BIPT, 
which then informs them about possible infringements.
Concerning inter-policy specialisation, the EU tele-
coms package initially produced a confl ict of competence 
between BIPT and the Regional media regulators. Th e 
Constitutional Court compelled the Regions and the 
Federation to reach an agreement, signed in 2006, that set 
up the CRC and the Inter-Ministerial Committee to solve 
this kind of confl icts.
Non-Binding Coordination in Energy
Liberalisation of the electricity and natural gas sectors 
has been driven by the European Union as of 1996, but 
enforced since 2002 in Belgium. Th e regulatory arrange-
ments of both sectors are divided in four submarkets: pro-
duction, transmission/transport, distribution and supply. 
Production and supply have been liberalized while trans-
mission/transport and distribution remain monopolies. 
At the Federal level, the Minister of Energy regulates the 
use of the transmission and transport networks with the 
support of the independent Commission for the Electric-
ity and Gas Regulation (CREG), while the Regional level 
is aimed towards distribution networks. Th e European 
Commission is not directly involved in the day-to-day 
regulatory process.
Several structural ties link the EU and the Federal or 
Regional levels together. Comitology committees com-
posed of national representatives advise the European 
Commission together with the European Regulators’ 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). Th e involve-
ment of the Commission in regulation is generally limited 
to the provision of standard guidelines about cross-bor-
der connections. In the recently approved third package 
the competencies of the EU-level are expanded, and it is 
anticipated that the new European Agency for Energy, 
ACER, will be more involved in technical regulation. 
Between the Federal and Regional levels, the competen-
cies are exclusive, i.e. each level works on their own, but 
advisory platforms coordinate common matters (Overleg 
Staat-Gewesten Groep, and Forum des régulateurs belges de 
l’électricité et du gaz). Th e only exception is tariff  regula-
tion, which is done on the Federal level by the Federal sec-
tor regulator for both the transmission/transport network 
and the distribution networks.
As such, the policy levels are independent from each 
other and coordination is mainly horizontal. At the 
Federal level, the Minister of Energy grants the licences 
to the supplier, yet, CREG prepares the draft decision. 
Th e division of work is similar at the Regional level. For 
example, the Flemish Government sets the general con-
ditions for licensing suppliers, after a non-binding advice 
of the Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits 
en Gasmarkt (VREG). VREG grants the license, but the 
Flemish Minister of the Energy can overturn this. Th e 
most important diff erence between the two levels is that 
the Federal Minister takes most regulatory decisions, while 
it is the sector-based regulator on the Regional level.
Th e division of competencies between the energy regu-
lators and the general competition authorities is relatively 
clear. At the Federal level, CREG reports anti-competitive 
behaviour to the Federal Minister and the Competition 
Council. Th e instrument is the exchange of confi dential 
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information, which had not been possible for some time, 
but legislative changes were made to correct this blind spot. 
Th e Regional level is not involved in general competition.
In terms of cross-sector coordination, there is no spe-
cialisation between natural gas and electricity. Th e same 
organisations are responsible for regulating both sectors. 
With other sectors, such as the environment, coordina-
tion is usually organised at the Government levels during 
the policy-making stage through inter-cabinet and inter-
department consultations.
Non-Binding Coordination in Specialised Regulatory 
Arrangements
A quite substantial number of authorities across diff erent 
governmental levels participate to the regulatory arrange-
ments, especially in the energy sector where Federal and 
Regional sector regulators are present. Independent regu-
latory agencies advise the legislator and either take deci-
sions on individual cases or prepare ministerial decisions. 
Th e comparison of the non-binding coordination instru-
ments used in the energy and telecoms sectors follows the 
four dimensions of specialisation (see Table 1).
Non-binding coordination instruments are widely 
used in the vertical interactions. In telecoms, the European 
Commission gives a non-binding advice on Federal draft 
laws and the choice of remedies to BIPT. Reciprocally, 
BIPT is consulted about draft European directives. Th ese 
consultations do not take place in the energy sector where 
governmental relationships dominate. Th e other instru-
ments are used in both sectors. Advisory platforms com-
posed of the national sector-based regulators advise the 
European Commission. In energy, a platform also facili-
tates coordination between the Federal and Regional levels. 
Exchange of information occurs between the Commission 
and the Member States. Coordinating bodies such as the 
EU Communications Committee or ENOVER for the 
preparation of Belgian decisions for energy make up this 
vertical coordination.
Non-binding instruments are much less used in hori-
zontal dimension in the telecoms than in the energy sec-
tors. In both sectors, the main regulators are consulted 
about drafts Federal or Regional laws. In energy, the coop-
eration between the Regions passes through the FORBEG 
platform even if it was not initially designed for this. 
Equally, the Flemish Region organises periodical manage-
ment meetings between the administrations and agencies 
(for example, energy savings).
Th e cooperation between the sector-based and general 
competition authorities uses non-binding instruments as 
well. In telecoms, the Competition Council is consulted 
on draft decisions of BIPT, but not in the energy sector 
where cooperation is limited to informal contacts with 
CREG and VREG. A procedure of exchange of confi den-
tial information is in place and the regulators have the duty 
to denounce anti-competitive behaviour. At the EU level, 
inter-department consultations are frequent and even took 
the form of a joint task force in the telecoms sector.
Despite the huge impacts of these sectors on econom-
ics and society, the non-binding instruments are not much 
used in inter-policy coordination. Th is coordination is 
limited to the classical inter-department consultations at 
each level of authority. Th e diff erent regulators and au-
thorities at federal and regional level do not have formal 
procedural contacts, except in few binding procedures (for 
example, the technical requirements for mobile phone 
antennas).
Conclusions
Th e aim of this article was to show the role of non-
binding instruments in the coordination of regulation in 
network industries from a comparison of the telecoms and 
energy sectors in Belgium. First, the results show that non-
binding coordination instruments are widely used in both 
sectors and developed in every dimension of specialisation. 
Telecommunications Energy
Vertical Horizontal Competition Inter-policy Vertical Horizontal Competition Inter-policy
Non-binding 
advice
X X X - - X - -
Advisory 
platform
X - - - X X - -
Information 
exchange and 
reporting
X - X - X - X -
Coordinating 
body
X - X X X X - X
Table 1 | Distribution of policy fi elds over levels of government.
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Th ey contribute to enhance interactions between regula-
tors at diff erent levels or with diff erent tasks. Second, dif-
ferences between sectors are obvious. Vertical integration 
is high in the telecoms while the energy regulation is rather 
organised horizontally. Th e strategic character of energy 
issues and the will of national government to keep con-
trol on the sector is a possible explanation of this diff er-
ence. Th ird, the weight of some regulators is high even 
if they intervene only through non-binding procedures in 
the decision-making process. Usually, their advice is fol-
lowed because they hold the technical expertise. Fourth, 
some signifi cant non-binding coordination operate ‘in the 
shadow of the law’; in other words, regulators use non-
binding procedures at one stage, but with the possibility 
to decide alone or veto a decision at a later stage. Th is 
wide use of non-binding coordination instruments attests 
of the complexity of the interactions between the diff er-
ent actors involved in the regulation of liberalised network 
industries. It also reveals a consciousness and a reaction to 
the challenges of a specialised regulatory arrangement in 
terms of preserving the eff ectiveness of regulation. 
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